The main contribution of this paper is to explore the formation of Palestinians' attitudes towards a peace process, with a particular focus on the role of education. Understanding the factors that shape attitudes towards peace is important, especially for conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian, which are largely psychological. In particular, there is disagreement about the role of education. While some authors have linked violent and extreme positions to ignorance and to low market opportunities, others have found that education is positively correlated with being a member of a terrorist group. To better understand the role of education I propose to decompose the attitudes towards peace into two dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards concessions. To measure these attitudes, I use the methodology proposed by Spady (2007) , which allows to take into account the multidimensionality of the concepts. It also imposes very few parametric assumptions. The results suggest that education has a positive effect on attitudes towards concessions but a negative effect on attitudes towards reconciliation. The results support the hypothesis that what determines the negative effect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is a better perception of the economic and political deprivation of the Palestinian society rather than personal losses due to the conflict.
Introduction
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been considered one of the most complex and emotion-laden historical problems of the twentieth century. This dispute between the State of Israel and the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation has played a critical role not only in Middle East politics, but also at the world level (see Freedman (1979) ).
Repeatedly, a two state solution has been proposed, consisting in an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Several efforts at negotiating such a solution have taken place and failed. According to many polls, 1 large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians would also favor a two state solution. Despite this basic agreement, there are significant areas of disagreement about what could be an acceptable solution. First, not all Palestinians and Israelis agree on the concessions they are willing to make in order to reach a peace agreement. Second, there is a problem of credibility; even if a peace agreement is reached, reconciliation between the two societies does not seem easy and therefore each side fears that the other might not keep the basic commitments. As a consequence, the conflict has been going on for many years and the level of violence has been increasing.
The goal of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence about how Palestinians' personal and demographic characteristics can affect their attitudes towards a peace process. As Jaeger, Klor, Miaari and Paserman (2008) notice, "These conflicts, [like the Israeli-Palestinian one,] in which a limited number of fatalities are used to affect negotiations, demoralize the civilian population, or strategically incapacitate the opponent, are largely psychological." Within Palestinian society, there are a variety of views and opinions. Understanding the factors that shape the attitudes of individual Palestinians is important because it can help to identify some important elements for a successful peace process. Recently, there have been some attempts to study the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from this point of view; e.g. Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) , Jasso and Meyersson (2004) , Friedman (2005) and Jaeger et al. (2008) .
While exploring the determinants of Palestinians' attitudes to the conflict more generally, the paper focusses in particular on the role played by education. Often, violent and extreme (2007) and Jaeger et al. (2008) ). In contrast to this, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that "having a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher education is positively associated with participation in violent groups." Similarly, using a unique data set detailing the biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) estimate the returns to human capital in suicide bombing and find that older and more educated suicide bombers are assigned to more important targets and perform better (more casualties and lower probability of failure). Because the relation between education and political violence is disputed, it is important to analyze its role on attitudes towards a peace process.
I define attitudes towards a peace process as consisting of two components: attitudes to- The measure I propose allows for the multidimensionality of attitudes to peace (involving attitudes both towards reconciliation and towards concessions) and takes into account various facets of each of the dimensions. It thus goes beyond the use of a single, specific question, capturing only a single aspect of a particular dimension, as often seen in the literature (e.g. Jaeger et al. (2008) ). This is important because a measure of a broad concept such as attitudes towards a peace process arguably improves if it can span several dimensions. In our analysis we use six items (questions) for the reconciliation scale and four for the concessions scale. Each of the items can be seen as reflecting a different dimension of the concept.
The results of the paper indicate that I) There are theoretical reasons for considering attitudes towards peace as composed of two distinct dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards concessions. This multidimensional construct provides new meaningful insights about the role of education. II) Education has a negative effect on attitudes towards reconciliation. This negative effect has been strengthening over the years in the sample (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . III) What drives the negative effect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is a better perception of the economic and political deprivation of the Palestinian society rather than personal losses due to the conflict. IV) Using data for 2006 I find that in contrast to the results on reconciliation, education is positively related to attitudes towards concessions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revises briefly the previous evidence on the relationship between individuals attitudes and the conflict. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical argument for treating attitudes towards peace as a composite of two dimensions. This argument will also guide the estimation. In Section 4 I describe the methodology used to obtain the measure of the attitudes. In Section 5 I present the data used, and I describe the questionnaire items and the personal and demographic characteristics of the respondents that play a role in the estimation of the latent attitudes. I Section 6 I obtain the measure of attitudes towards reconciliation and analyze its determinants and its correlation with economic trends.
I also investigate the channel through which the events of the conflict can shape attitudes. In Section 7 I obtain the measure of attitudes towards concessions; I analyze its determinants as well as the joint distribution of these attitudes with the attitudes towards reconciliation. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Previous evidence on the relationship between individuals' attitudes and the conflict
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has generated a considerable amount of social research. In most of this research there is implicitly the idea that the conflict shapes individuals' attitudes and that these attitudes have an effect on individuals' behavior. In the work by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) , it is argued that terror activity makes that individuals value less the future relative to the present and they show that these changes in individuals' perceptions have influences on macroeconomic aggregates (reduces investment and in the long run it reduces income and consumption). Zussman and Zussman (2006) evaluate the net effect of the Israeli counterterrorism policy. These authors argue that assassinating members of Palestinian terrorist organizations can have a counterproductive effect if it increases Palestinians' motivation for future attacks.
Their idea is that it is possible to find moral objections to this type of policy, and these moral objections can affect Palestinians' attitudes and therefore increase retaliation. To evaluate the effect of this policy, they exploit the forward-looking and information-aggregating nature of asset markets, and they use the Israeli stock market reactions to news of such operations. They find that the market perceives the assassinations of low-ranked members of Palestinian terrorist organizations as counterproductive but the assassinations of senior-leaders as an effective measure in combating terrorism.
Also the work of Klor 2006, Berrebi and Klor 2007) presents the idea that terror attacks affect Israeli public opinion and this has an effect on election outcomes. To study the relation between Palestinian militant groups and Israeli political system they present a theoretical model where Palestinians commit terror attacks and Israelis elect governments. The predictions of the model suggest that support for Israels right-wing party increases after periods of severe terrorism and that the expected level of terrorism is higher when a left-wing party is in power. They show empirical evidence that supports these results.
The work of Paserman 2006, Jaeger and Paserman 2007) focuses mainly on trying to explain the dynamics of the violence, they find that Israel reacts in a predictable and significant way to Palestinian attacks, while Palestinians actions appear not to be related to Israeli violence. Their conclusion is that a cessation of Palestine violence against Israel may lead to an overall reduction in the level of violence. These results suggest that it is essential to understand what are the factors that can shape Palestinians' attitudes towards peace and towards the resolution of the conflict.
However, Palestinians' attitudes have not been studied very much. Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) notice that "Only a small portion of this research (on the Arab-Israeli dispute) has explored the determinants of popular attitudes towards the conflict, however, the factors that 
Theoretical considerations on the attitudes towards a peace process
To analyze attitudes towards a peace process, we must take into account that these attitudes can have different dimensions. Plausibly, both individuals' expectation of the future economical benefits from peace and moral and existential consideration are a part of attitudes towards peace. Therefore we can write:
where AP i are individual's attitudes towards peace, EB i are the expected economical benefits from reaching a peace agreement and M P i are the moral and existential considerations related to the conflict.
Economical Benefits from peace (EB). From a rational choice perspective, individuals'
attitudes towards a peace process should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. Individuals will be more likely to support a peace process and to make some concessions when they expect peace to improve their personal economic situation. Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) , using data for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, find empirical evidence that gives support to this hypothesis; individuals who believe that a peace settlement will worsen the condition of the national economy or their personal economic status are less likely than others to support peace negotiations and compromise. Starting from this evidence, I argue that expected economic benefits will translate into 'views on positions expressed and concessions discussed in the negotiations'.
Moral and Existential Problems related to the conflict (MP). Palestinians can also define their attitudes towards peace based on moral and existential terms. For most Palestinians the creation of the state of Israel has implied the loss of their houses and their land, by force and without their consent. Their general perception is that they have been the perpetual victims of the conflict and that they have been exposed to continuous humiliation by the Israelis, receiving little external support. Therefore, when defining their attitudes towards a peace process, these long-standing feelings will play an important role. Depression and despair due to the occupation could imply more adverse attitudes towards reconciliation. The stronger these feelings of frustration and victimization are, the more difficult it will be to normalize relations with the Israelis. Therefore, these moral and existential problems will translate into different 'views on chances for reconciliation and lasting peace in a scenario of successful negotiations'.
We will hence write an individual's overall attitudes AP i as a function of both 'views on chances for reconciliation and lasting peace in a scenario of successful negotiations' (Attitudes towards Reconciliation AR i ) and 'views on positions expressed and concessions discussed on the negotiations' (Attitudes towards Concessions AC i ):
Considering attitudes towards a peace process as composed of two different concepts; attitudes towards reconciliation (AR) and attitudes towards concessions (AC), it can help to understand what is the role of education in a peace process and to clarify the controversial results previously found in the literature.
The role of education
The level of education in Palestinian territories is specially high given the socio economic characteristics of this society. But the economic conditions of most Palestinians are bad. The structure of the economy has not changed much since the beginning of the century (wee world bank), the productive sector is very small and it cannot give jobs to most of the educated labor force. Palestinian individuals see how education cannot guarantee them social mobility. Therefore, it seems plausible to think that in case of successful negotiations and peace with Israel, more educated individuals would be the ones having more to gain from economic reconciliation. Therefore more educated individuals should be more in favor of realizing concessions.
We have linked attitudes towards reconciliation to moral and existential problems. There is no economic theory that can give a convincing answer about what would be the role of education in shaping this type of attitudes. There are two possible situations:
1. If the moral and existential concerns are linked to personal losses, then not necessarily we would expect a link between education and attitudes towards reconciliation.
2. If the moral and existential concerns are linked to a better and more global understanding of the situation then we will expect to find that eduction exerts a negative effect on attitudes towards reconciliation.
The role of education on the attitudes towards reconciliation will be an empirical question and I will analyze it further in section 6.
Measuring individuals' attitudes 4.1 Setting up the Model
In this section, I set up the model that will allow us to estimate the latent attitudes that I identify as attitudes towards a peace process. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the underlying process that I have in mind. I suppose that every individual has some amount of predisposition for a peace process, which will be a compilation of his/her attitudes on reconciliation and concessions. The attitudes towards reconciliation and concessions directly cause the responses to certain survey questions, and have an effect on the behavior of agents; e.g. on political decisions.
I also claim that demographic and personal characteristics may be informative about the way in which the predisposition to an agreement is distributed in a population; individual characteristics and experiences as well as community characteristics can be related to how much people are willing to reconciliate. I assume that these characteristics do not affect the answers directly. If they have an effect it is through their effect on the attitudes we are measuring here.
In the Data section I will discuss the variables I use to estimate the individual attitudes and I will give a theoretical justification of the personal and demographic characteristics used in the estimation.
In the next section I describe the methodology used to measure the attitudes towards reconciliation and to obtain the correlates with the individual personal characteristics. The methodology used for the analysis of the attitudes towards concessions is the same, it only differs for the items selection. The way in which the multi-scale index is constructed is described in section 7.
Methodology: An Item Response Model
The methodology that we will use in this paper is the one proposed by Spady (2007) , which allows us to get quantitative measures of latent attitudes, without imposing specific parametric assumptions. The only assumptions needed are that (1) the expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions about conflict resolution ('item responses') reflect corresponding attitudes of the responder; (2) the 'attitudes' are enduring individual-specific attributes, given the individual's characteristics and environment. (3) We will use one series of item responses, and we will assume that the series has been determined by a single attitude (attitudes towards reconciliation).
As described above, we use 6 item responses with 4 categorical responses each, stemming from the sample of individuals for each year considered in the analysis. In that case there are 4 6 = 4096 cells or possible combinations of responses. We assume that the item responses are determined by the individual's attitude towards reconciliation a. The probability of a particular response pattern (or cell) conditional on a is simply the product of the constituent item probabilities. 2
That is, we assume (for m items),
To make more efficient use of the information available, we also exploit the information from personal and demographic characteristics. We assume that individual i has certain characteristics W i , and that the distribution f (·) of the latent attitude can be influenced by these characteristics W i , that means f (a|W i ). Concretely, as the theoretical model implies, suppose that W gives rise to social experiences, and consequently attitudes may change; the attitudes are then reflected in item responses. So we have:
Equation 5 is used to estimate simultaneously how W affects a and how a affects item responses. We specify that f (a|W ) is represented by a N (µ(W ), 1) 3 , where
So a is normal with a mean that is a linear function of the characteristics W . Equation 6 implies that f (a|W ) is a N (0, 1) for the 'standardized respondent' and that the different groups of the population, characterized by different W , are also normally distributed with possibly different values of location µ. 4 We can then infer the individual distribution of attitudes towards reconciliation. Applying Bayes' Law, the distribution of the attitude a for an individual person,
given his answers and personal characteristics is:
The elements of this expression have all been estimated previously; p(r|W ) is given as p(r|a)f (a|W )da in equation 5.
Data
For this project we use the public opinion surveys designed and conducted by the Palestinian The standardized person is a male who lives in Hebron, has the mean age of the sample (this differs depending on the year), is married, has a medium level of income per family member, is not a refugee, has low education and prays very often. subset of these items, valuable information might be lost. This is also indicated by the pairwise correlation coefficients for the items shown in Table 3 ; correlations are positive but far from perfect.
Corresponding to the theoretical model, we expect that some demographic variables will be informative about the individual attitudes, therefore, they will also be used in the estimation.
A descriptive analysis of these variables is shown in Table 4 . This table shows an increase in the percentage of individuals with high levels of education and with a high degree of religiosity.
The theoretical justification for the personal and demographics characteristics included in the estimation is the following:
Education. As commented above, it is not well understood in the existing literature what is the role of education on shaping the attitudes towards a peace process. In this paper we hope to shed some light on the connection of education with Palestinians' attitudes. To measure education we use three dummy variables: Low education is equal to 1 if the individual has elementary education or less, Medium Education is equal to 1 if the individual has preparatory or secondary education. High education is equal to 1 if the individual has college or more.
Religion: personal piety. As said in Tessler and Nachtway (1998) "The theoretical linkage between religion and international politics is based on the assumption that religion plays a crucial role in shaping both the normative orientation of individuals and their understanding of the surrounding world". These authors find that different dimensions of religiosity have different effects on individuals' attitudes towards politics or towards international conflicts. They find that support for political Islam or religious activism have a strong effect on the individuals' political views, while personal piety is unrelated to those views. Unfortunately we are not able to distinguish between these two dimensions of religiosity. We only have information on the degree of personal piety, the measure of personal piety that we use is three dummy variables based in the answer to the following question: "How often do you pray? 1) every day, 2) only on Friday or occasionally, 3) rarely o never."
Economic determinants: household income/family size. The correlation between individuals' current economic situation is a priori ambiguous. It could be that individuals who are currently doing well believe that this will allow them to benefit more from economic opportunities arising with peace. It may, however, also motivate them to avoid change, and pit them against an agreement, whereas the poor might support it in the hope of an improvement in their situation, and because they have little to lose. On the other hand, they may be frustrated due to their economic situation, and not believe in the benefits of an agreement. In this sense, Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) find that currently unsatisfied individuals tend to be against an agreement.
In addition, there is some new evidence finding little relationship between hate crimes in general and economic conditions, it is possible that these relationship also holds for attitudes towards reconciliation. 6 We measure household income using three dummies; Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience but also due to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be informative. In addition, there may be cohort effects. Since the survey is a series of cross sections, it is not possible to disentangle life cycle and cohort effects.
Working for the Public Sector. The public sector continues to be an important source of Palestinian employment. In 2003, public sector employment (PA and municipalities) accounted for an estimated 26 percent of total employment in the West Bank and Gaza. For many young men coming from poor families this is the only way obtaining social mobility. Therefore, working for the public sector is also and indication of how well the individual is doing.
Being unmarried Being unmarried in Palestine can be another source of frustration. Marriage is important because it represents the key to adulthood but also because it is a religious obligation (which only adds to the pressure -and the guilt). Marriage is expensive, some families have to save all their lives to afford the weeding of their children (see Brookings study for how
Middle East has the lowest rates of marriage in the developing world). Since the economical situation has been deteriorating in the last years, it is possible that individuals that cannot afford a marriage and have to wait seeking outlets for their frustration and translating this towards more negative effects on the attitudes towards reconciliation.
We also control for gender and region of residence as they can influence the experiences faced during life.
Attitudes towards reconciliation: evolution and determinants
In section 3.1 I have linked attitudes towards reconciliation with feelings of frustration and victimization that are consequence of the political events and of the existence of the conflict.
There is no theoretical argument that can give a proper answer about what the role of education should be. In this section I shed some light on this issue. For this purpose I use some descriptive statistics to show that the evolution of the individuals' attitudes towards reconciliation is linked to the evolution of the GDP and the political events. I show that education has a negative effect on attitudes towards reconciliation and that this negative effect has been strengthening over years in the sample (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and I use the construction of the separation barrier to explore the channel through which the conflict affects the attitudes towards reconciliation.
Relation with economic expectations and political events
Before delving into how attitudes towards reconciliation are related to demographic characteristics, it is interesting to have a quick look at their evolution over time. Having estimated each individual attitudes, we compute the average for each year of the sample. In sum, the evolution of GDP is closely linked to political events (the Intifada, peace talks).
Average attitudes evolve in a similar way, though it is unclear whether this is due to the evolution of GDP, or whether politics is a common driving force. Then again, attitudes could also be driving some political events. All this indicates that there is a strong interdependence between politics and economics in the West Bank and Gaza, and that there is an interdependence between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation. Therefore, while economic deprivation may not be associated with worse attitudes towards reconciliation at the individual level, it may nonetheless matter at the national level.
Relation with personal and demographic characteristics across time
As explained above, the methodology used allows inferring the relationship between demographics and estimated attitudes. Table 5 shows the effect of the personal characteristics on the mean of the probability distribution of attitudes towards peace for a given person. The effects are additive, which means that statements such as 'more educated people have less pro reconciliation attitudes' must be understood in a 'ceteris paribus' sense (Spady (2006) ). The effect of Age is shown in Figure 4 . 7
Education is closely related to attitudes towards reconciliation. Higher levels of education affect the attitudes towards reconciliation negatively. The first panel of Figure 5 shows the evolution of the effect of education over time. The coefficient on the high education dummy is significantly negative in all years except for 2001, and becomes stronger (more negative) over time.
The negative effect of education is similar to results obtained by other authors. They find that education has a negative impact on attitudes towards peace negotiation (Abu Sada (1998)) or towards the Road Map (Jasso and Meyersson (2004) ). These authors explain this result by the fact that better educated respondents have more access to information and are therefore more aware of the problems of the possible agreements. When relating education to attitudes towards reconciliation, related explanations may apply. In that case, this results are supportive of the hypothesis that more highly educated individuals have a better understanding of the political situation and they may feel more frustrated and be less in favor of reconciliation. This hypothesis fits with the growing importance of the education coefficient, which accompanies the deteriorating political and economic situation.
Finally, it is unlikely that the education system itself negatively affects attitudes to reconciliation. Firstly, since most Palestinians attend public schools and schools operated by UNRWA, and since all schools share the same curriculum, spending more time in school is unlikely to radicalize students. The measure of education used here refers to this type of schools.
Another factor that is strongly related to attitudes towards reconciliation is the degree of religiosity (measured as the frequency with which the individual prays). The evolution of the effect of religiosity is shown in the second panel of Figure 5 . The results indicate that in 2001, the attitudinal differences among individuals with different degree of religiosity were weak. With time, differences become more clear. More religious people tend be less favorable to reconciliation. Causality is not clear, since we do not know if people with more negative attitudes towards reconciliation become more religious or if more religious individuals changed their attitudes toward reconciliation.
Although economic factors are often mentioned and may matter at the aggregate level, we find that family income does not have a significant effect on attitudes towards reconciliation. So relative income is not significantly related to attitudes.
Age matters, younger respondents are less in favor of reconciliation (see Figure 4) . The cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to distinguish whether this pattern is due to life cycle patterns (age properly speaking) or to cohort effects. Being female, being a refugee, working for the public sector, or being unmarried do not have significant effects.
Overall, young, educated or religious individuals are less in favor of reconciliation with Israel, with the effects of education and religion strengthening over time. In the next section, we have a close look at the effect of education.
The effects of the separation barrier on the attitudes towards reconciliation
The Israeli authorities have constructed a barrier (wall) along the borders of the West Bank with Israel. The Israeli government has declared that the objective of the wall is to protect
Israeli citizens from the attacks of the suicide bombers. The trajectory of the wall is depicted in Figure 3 . To build the wall, Palestinian land has been expropriated. In addition, the wall at times extends far into the West Bank, leaving parts of it inaccessible or disrupting circulation between villages.
The effects that the separation barrier has on the Palestinians can be split in two:
1. The separation barrier restricts the Palestinians who live nearby, particularly their ability to travel freely within the West Bank and to access work in Israel, or to access other services (health, education or religious sites). Moreover, its presence reduces arable land.
Therefore the separation barrier directly affects the population of the localities through which the wall passes, and this economic losses are likely to be more localized.
2. Many palestinians see the separation barrier as an attempt to artificially create a border, creating 'facts on the ground.' Therefore, the wall can also affect Palestinians generally, because it can translate to moral and existential concerns.
Because the data tell us where individuals live, we can use this for our analysis. In addition,
we have the measures of the evolution of the length of the wall, the areas of land left outside the wall (in most of the cases, is land that has been confiscated) and the areas that have become enclaves. Table 10 shows the correlation of the attitudes towards concessions and the individuals' personal and demographic characteristics. The results indicate that the personal characteristics relate in a different manner than in the previous estimated scale; the positive effect of education that arises while controlling for income, we cannot control for potential income without the conflict, or for income lost due to the conflict, but this result seem to give support to the idea that in case of a successful resolution, more educated people would have more to gain from (economic) reconciliation. Then we would expect them to be more in favor of concessions.
Family income also seem to matter; families with lower income tend to support the concessions discussed in the peace talks.
Estimating the joint distribution
In this section we will estimate what is the join distribution of these two components of the attitudes towards a peace process; f (a R , a C |W ), and we will see if the join distribution has changed between 2000 and 2006. Where f (a R ) are attitudes towards 'chances for reconciliation and lasting peace in a scenario of successful negotiations' and f (a C ) are attitudes 'on positions expressed and concessions discussed on the negotiations'.
Thus we assume that if we know the attitude on reconciliation, the knowledge of the attitude on concessions is irrelevant to the responses pertaining to the reconciliation scale. Therefore we can write: R ) ...p(r m |a R ) and p(r m+1 |a C )p(r M |a C ) have already been estimated. We have specified f (a R , a C |W ) as having normal margins. For this exercise a R and a C have been scaled to be uniforms (0,1) separately. We can completely specify f (a R , a C |W ) in the original 'normal' space by simply supplying the missing covariance between a R and a C , and this is made to depend on W . The specification used is: Figure 6 shows the estimated joint density function for low levels of education (individuals with less than high school) and for high levels of education (individuals with some college or more). Notice that reconciliation and concessions have been scaled on (0,1), i.e. 'percentiles'
and the height of the figure is the corresponding density. We observe that reconciliations and concessions are positively correlated since the density in (1,1) and (0,0) is very high and the density in (1,0) and (0,1) is much lower in both graphs. Comparing the two graphs we observe that for low educated individuals the amount of mass situated at low levels of reconciliation and high levels of concessions is lower than for the high educated. This supports the idea that if we are interested in analyzing attitudes towards a peace precess, one dimension is not enough.
Both dimensions makes the analysis richer and gives a better idea about what is the role of education.
Conclusion
Given the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, hints about why it is so hard to resolve are very valuable. In this paper, we have used Palestinian survey data to explore the determinants of Palestinians' attitudes towards the peace process, understood as attitudes towards possible concessions they might be willing to make to achieve a settlement, and attitudes towards reconciliation in case of such a settlement. Because of the breadth of the object to be measured, the use of more than one dimension is natural. This is confirmed by the empirical analysis of the joint distribution of attitudes. Concerning the determinants, we focus particularly on education because of its ambiguous role in previous literature.
On economic grounds, more educated people could be expected to have more to gain from a peace process, in particular in the context of the repressed Palestinian economy. The empirical analysis indeed confirms that controlling for current family income more educated people are more willing to make concessions. This could be understood as an investment in peace, allowing the dividends of peace to be reaped later on.
The effect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is disputed in previous work.
Some authors argue that less educated people are more prone to violence and hatred, while others find the opposite: more educated people are more likely to be involved in violent groups.
We find results more consistent with the latter stream of the literature, and then probe a bit deeper to identify a channel.
At the macro level, it is clear that there is a strong interdependence between politics and economics, and between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation. While economic deprivation may not be associated with worse attitudes towards reconciliation at the individual level, periods of economic stagnation or contraction coincide with worsening attitudes at the national level. At the same time, the significantly negative effect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation strengthens. I can identify that this is not due to direct, local effects of the separation barrier: these can be found only for people with low education. It hence seems plausible that events at the national level drive attitudes of people with high education. Knowing that both the barrier and the general situation affect attitudes, even if for different groups of people, may be important for the peace process. Education and economic aid may not be sufficient remedies.
Appendix
Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate the individual's attitudes towards reconciliation:
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps may be taken in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State.
For each of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:
-Open borders to free movement of people and goods.
-Create joint economic institutions and ventures.
-Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed eventually to lead to a confederate system) -Take legal measures against incitement against Israel.
-Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you, under these conditions of peace, invite an Israeli colleague to visit you in your home?
Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate the individual's attitudes towards concessions:
The individuals are informed of the permanent compromise settlement, then they are ask what do they think of each of the following items (Do they agree or disagree with them): These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.)
• A sovereign state with security arrangements. (The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15
years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.) 
